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In The Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ST. GEORGE CITY, a municipal corporation,
vs.
Plaintiff,
MILL CREEK WATER CO'MP ANY, a
corporntion, ISRAEL NIELSON, STEVE
KURTLAND, MARION JOLLY, MELVIN
ADAMS, JOHN AVE RITT, and JOSEPH
BARLOW,
Defendants,
WASHINGTON CITY, a municipal corporation, ROAD RUNNER INN, a corporation,
and DARRE·LL G. HAFEN,
Intervening Defendants,

Case No. 2508

MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY,
vs.
Plaintiff,
ISRAEL NIELSON and CADDIE NIELSON,
GLEN TOBLER and BEATRICE TOBLER,
THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, a municipal co1•poration, and NORMA WALKER,
Defendants,
ROAD RUNNER INN, a corporation, and
DARRELL G. HAFEN,
Intervening Defendants,

Case No. 2940

MELVIN ADAMS, MARION JOLLEY,
STEVEN E. KIRKLAND and
WASHINGTON CITY ·CORPORATION,
vs.
Plaintiffs,
MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY, a
co1·poration, ST. GEORGE CITY, and the
STATE ENGINEER OF UTAH,
Defendants.
WASHINGTON CITY CORPORATION,
vs.
Plaintiff,
MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY, a
corporation, MELVIN ADAMS, ST.
GEORGE CITY, STEVEN E. KIRKLAND,
MARION JOLLEY and the STATE
ENGINEER OF UTAH
Defendants,
MARION JOLLEY, ME'LVIN ADAMS,
STEVEN E. KIRKLAND,
vs.
Plaintiffs,
WASHINGTON CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant,
JtOAD RUNNER INN, a corporation, and
DARRELL G. HAFEN,
Intervening Defendants,

Case No. 3036

1

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This appeal involves three separate civil actions
1

filed in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for
Washington County, which cases were consolidated
for trial, for the reason that all three cases deal
directly with the rights to the waters of the Mill
or Sand Hollow Creek in Washington County, Utah,
some of which were originally owned by the Mill
Creek Water Company under the 1'926 "Virgin River
Decree".

Civil No. 2508 is a condemnation action brought
by St. George City to condemn for domestic use the
waters of Mill Creek. The Mill Creek Water Company, the original holder of some of the water
rights in said stream, and the other named defendants, all of whom were shareholders in the Mill
Creek Water Company, were joined as defendants.
Civil'No. 2940 is an action brought by the City
of St. George in the name of the 'QMill Creek Water
Company" to acquire easements and rights of way
for the purpose of constructing an irrigation ditch
to convey the waters of the plaintiff company to a
reservoir under construction by St. George City at
the time said action was commenced.
Civil No. 3036 is a petition brought by the appellants herein a:sking a court review of a series of
decisions of the Utah State Engineer bearing directly on the rights of petitioners (appellants herein)
in the waters of the Mill or Sand Hollow Creek and
the Green Ditch in Washington County, State of
Utah.
2

The appellants herein, Steven E. Kirkland, Melvin Adams, and Marion Jolley, were shareholders
in the old Mill Creek Water Company and also had
filed application with the State Engineer to appropri'ate waters of the Mill Creek or Sand Hollow,
these appropriations having been applied for in their
individual capacities and not as shareholders in
the old company, and the waters sought to be appropriated were waters claimed by appellants to have
been abandoned 'by the Mill Creek Water Company.
Appellant Washington City, a municipal corporation, 'by the terms of the Virgin River Decree is the
owner of .38 c.f.s. of the waters of Mill Creek and
has also filed application before the State Engineer
to appropriate a portion of the waters also claimed
by it to have been abandoned by the old Mill Creek
Water Company. It should be remembered that the
references to the "Mill Creek Water Company" hereinabove made are to the old company of that name,
the charter of which expired by its terms on February 20, 19'53.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A summary judgment was entered by the trial
court on motion of St. George City and the new Mill
Creek Water Company. This judgment declared that
the new Mill Creek Water Company was legally incorporated under the laws of the State of Utah and
was the successor to all of the rights in the waters
of Mill Creek or Sand Hollow which had been owned
3

by the old Mill Creek Water Company, the charter
of which had expired. The court ruled in making its
summary judgment that there had been no termination of ownership or use of the waters of Sand
Hollow or Mill Creek between the date on which the
corporate charter of the old company expired, February 20, 1953, and the date on which the new company was incorporated, February 8, 1957. The court
in its judgment stated that "the new company merely provided another vehicle for such ownership and
use of such waters." Based on this premise, the
court adjudged the new company to have succeeded
to all of the ownership rights, interests and powers
of the old Mill Creek Water Company. Then by its
own fiat in having so decided, the court concluded
as a part of the judgment that the new company
was the proper party before the court to give jurisdiction for the effective adjudication of the rights
in the water of Mill Creek or Sand Hollow. The
court, further based on its own conclusion that the
new company was a successor to the rights of the
old company, ruled that the new company had the
status to apply to the State Engineer for a change
in point of diversion, under the water rights owned
by the old company, and decreed that the State Engineer had rightfully entertained and approved the
application of the said new company. It is with this
summary judgment of the court that these appellants take issue.
4

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants ask that this court reverse the decision and summary judgment of the lower court
entered in favor of the respondent and against the
appellants. The appellants further ask that this
Court make its ruling that as a matter of law:
(a) 'The corporation known and referred to as
the old Mill Creek Water Company ceased to exist
as a legal entity when its charter expired February
20, 1953, and its assets including the water rights
then owned by it reverted to the stockholders of
record on that date.
(b) The new Mill Creek Water Company incorporated in Utah February 8, 1957, did not succeed to the rights and property owned by the old
corpora ti on.
(c) The action of the lower court granting an
order of occupancy depriving appellants of their
water rights based on the premise that the new company succeeded to the rights of the old is in error,
and results in depriving appellants of their property
without due process of law.
The case should be remanded to the District
Court for trial under the law of the case as established by the rulings of this Court on the foregoing
matters. The district court should then be required
to determine what water rights exist in the Mill
C1·et:k or Sand Hollow, who the owners are, the use
5

that has been made thereof, and the status, as appropriators before the State Engineer, of the parties
to these actions. All rulings of the State Engineer
relative to the water rights involved in this litigation should be suspended pending the outcome of
this lawsuit. The trial court should further be instructed to ascertain what damages, if any, have
been suffered by the appellants as a result of having
been deprived of the use of waters of Mill Creek or
Sand Hollow, to which appellants are determined to
have been properly entitled, by St. George City
under the order of occupancy erroneously granted
by the lower court on the 20th day of May, 1957.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Mill Creek Water Company was organized and incorporated as a mutual water company
in the State of Utah on February 20, 1903, by the
then land owners and appropriators of the waters
of Mill Creek and Green Spring in Washington
County, State of Utah, for the purpose of controlling, regulating and distributing the said waters.
The articles of said corporation limited its existence to a period of fifty ( 50) years and provided
for a capitalization of 2171/2 shares of stock. All
assets of the company were owned and controlled
by the stockholders. ( R. 92)
1.

1

2. No certificates of stock were actually issued
by the Mill Creek Water Company until March 8,
6

1923 when certificates totaling 196 shares were issued to the following parties: ( R. 9'2)

Cert. No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Name
Samuel L. Gould
Morgan W. Adams
M. E. Averett
Robert L. Covington
Sherman Cooper
E. M. Iverson
W. L. Jolley
A.H. Larson
Willard Larson
Israel Neilson, Sr.
Israel Neilson, Jr.
Edward F. Nisson
Washington Mill Co.
David Turner Est.
Claude Adams
Peter Neilson, Sr.
Joseph Judd

No. Shares
4
35
lTY2
5
lll-h
6
7V2

V2

14
25
221h
4
24V2
2
8
5
4

3. On December 12, 1925, by decree entered
in the District Court of Washington County, State
of Utah, commonly known as the "Virgin River Decree," 2.57 c.f.s. of water from Sand Hollow Creek
was awarded to the Mill Creek Water Company for
use on 141.5 acres located as follows: 20. 7 acres
in Section 22, and 77.1 acres in Section 2'3, both
dlverted from Sand Hollow Creek in West Ditch
and 43. 7 acres in Section 23 diverted from Sand
7

Hollow Creek in East Ditch. Under awards No. 176
and 176A of the Virgin River Decree, Washington
City diverts 0.68 c.f.s. of water from Mill Creek
into Tanner Ditch for domestic use. (R. 92; Ex. 1)
4. Thereafter. the Mill Creek Water Company
continued to deal with and distribute the 2.57 c.f.s.
of the waters of Sand Hollow or Mill Creek, and
over the years there was some trading, selling or
otherwise disposing of their water rights by the
company's stockholders. (R. 9'3)
5. On February 20, 1953, the said company
concluded fifty ( 50) years of corporate existence.
No action was taken to extend the life of the corporation prior to that date. ( R. 93)
6. On February 20, 1953 the officers of the
company included among others the following: (R.
93)
Edward F. Nisson-President
Marion Jolley - Director
Melvin Adams - Director
Israel Neilson - Secretary-Treasurer
7. The records of the said company showed
the following as stockholders of the company on
February 20, 1953 at the expir:ation of the company's charter: ( R. 93)
8

Name

Certificate No.

Claude Adams
Melvin Adams
Melvin Adams
M. E. Averett
Joel C. Barlow
Sherman Cooper
William Gould
Marion Jolley
W. L. Jolley
W. L. Jolley
Frank Larsen
Israel Nielsen, Jr., Vernal
M. Nielsen and
Anton Nielson
Israel Nielsen, Jr.
Clark Nisson
Edward F. Nisson
Wayne Sandberg
Wayne Sandberg
Wayne Sanberg
Ivan Wittwer

Shares

51
50
31
3
47
5
30
33
7
26
34

8
24
5
171/2
1
1
4
31h
71h
l/2
9

35
11
43
21
4'2
49
45
46

25
22112
8
3
301h
13
5
8
1

8. Without taking any evidence or receiving
any affidavits on which to base the same the trial
court found ( R. 93), that the stockholders continued
to use all of the waters of Sand Hollow or Mill Creek
as they had done previously, and that there was no
indication whatever that anyone paid any attention
9

to the fact that the fifty year period had expired.
('R. 93)
9. On February 8, 1957, Articles of Incorporation of a company called the "Mill Creek Water
Company" were filed with the Secretary of the State
of lJtah, (Ex. 9) naming the following as officers
and directors: ( R. 93-94)
Edward F. Nisson, President-Director
Marion Jolley, Vice President-Director
Melvin Adams, Director
John W. Averett, Director
Israel Nielson, Director, Secretary.:Treasurer
The articles filed provided for the stock of the
corporation to be divided into 195 shares of the par
value of $100.00 each, and recited that the stock was
fully subscribed. The amount of capital stock in the
new company purportedly issued to the incorporators
at the time of incorporation was as follows:
Name
No. Shares
Edward F. Nissan
11
Marion J alley
111/2
Melvin Adams
29
John W. Averett
171/2
Israel Nielson
221/2
10. The trial court found that after its incorporation the new Mill Creek Water Company
dealt with the waters of Sand Hollow or Mill Creek
and the 2.57 c.f.s. of water decreed to the old Mill
Creek Water Company under the Virgin River De10

cree, and made a change application to the State
Engineer and otherwise acted as a mutual irrigation
company essentially as the old Mill Creek Water
Company had done during the fifty years of its corporate life. ( R. 94)
11. Without taking testimony and with no evidence save a copy of the articles of the new company the trial court found there was some indication of changes in the ownership of the stock of the
old company and the new company between February 1953 and February 1957, and stated that this
was attributable to the normal sale or trade of stock
by the holders thereof. The trial court also found
that the stock in the new company appeared to have
been issued in proportion to the stock held in the old
company and that St. George City had purchased
106 shares of stock in the new company. (R. 94)
12. On April 16, 1957, the City of St. George
filed Civil Action No. '2508, whereby it sought to
condemn the 2.57 c.f.s. of the waters of Sand Hollow belonging to the "Mill Creek ·water Company."
Joined in the action as defendants were the following individuals to whom the City of St. George conceded the amount of stock in the "Mill Creek Water
Company" listed opposite their names:
11

Name

No. Shares

Joseph Barlow (Subject to an agreement to sell the same to
Steven Kirkland)
9
Israel Nielson
121/2
Marion Jolley
111/2
Melvin Adams
29
John Averett
171/2
Said action did not seek to condemn any of the
waters of Green Spring, but only Sand Hollow water.
At the time said action was filed by St. George City,
it had no rapplication before the State Engineer of
the State of Utah to either appropriate the waters
or to change the point of diversion of the waters of
the Mill Creek stream. (R. 94, R. 1-9)
13. On April 29, 1957, the City of St. George
filed an application with the Utah State Engineer's
office, Application No. 29081, to appropriate 3.00
c.f.s. of the waters of Mill Creek. ( R. 95; Ex. 8)
14. On May 20, 1957, the trial court granted
St. George City an order allowing temporary possession of 2.57 c.f.s. of the waters of the springs
known as Sand Hollow Springs, and to permit collection and use of the same, ordered installation of
measuring devices and authorized the doing of such
other things as were necessary to collect, develop,
measure and use the said water during the pendency
of its action. St. George City took possession of the
waters of Sand Hollow under said order and has
at all times and still continues in possession of all
12

of said waters to the exclusion of appellants. (R. 95)
15. Pursuant to said order, St. George City
collected and continues to collect water within the
springs area upstream from all present diversions
and is conveying the water from the springs area
consisting of 42 springs, by pipe line to a pumping
plant from which waters are conveyed to and used
by St. George City. (R. 95)
16. On Janitary 28, 1958, the City of Washington filed Application No. 29676 in the State Engineer's office to appropriate 3.00 c.f.s. from Sand
Hollow Creek for domestic use in said city. (R. 95;
Ex. 2)
17. On January 14, 1959, Application No.
29081 originally filed by St. George to appropriate
3.00 c.f .s. of 'Sand Hollow water was rejected by
the State Engineer, on the grounds that any additional water taken from the source or sources of
Mill Creek would interfere with the decreed and certified rights of lower users who maintained dry
dams below the point of diversion. The State Engineer further held there was no unappropriated
water in the Mill Creek. No appeal from such rejection was ever filed by the City of St. George. (R.
95; Ex. 8)

18. On April 17, 1959, the City of St. George
filed application No. 59-5 with the Utah State Engineer, seeking a temporary change of point of di13

version of 2.57 c.f.s. of water from Sand Hollow
Creek. ( R. 95-96; Ex. 3)
19. On April 24, 1.959, Application No. 59-5
filed by the City of St. George was approved by the
State Engineer. ( R. 96; Ex. 3)
20. On July 21, 1959, Washington City filed
Application No. a-3592 with the Utah State Engineer for a permanent change of point of diversion of
.35 c.f.s. of water from Sand Hollow. (R. 96; Ex. 4)
21. On July 22, 1959, Washington City filed
Application No. a-3593 with the Utah State Engineer for a permanent change of point of diversion of
0.03 c.f.s. of water from Sand Hollow. (R. 96; Ex.
5)

22. On May 5, 1960, the City of St. George
filed Application No. 3741 with the Utah State Engineer to implement the court's order in awarding
temporary possession of the Mill Creek waters. The
State Engineer thereafter ruled that this application was not a proper foundation for action by the
State Engineer and requested that a new change
application be filed in the name of the holder of the
water right. ( R. 96)
23. On July 7, 1961, the new Mill Creek Water
Company filed application for permanent change of
point of diversion of 2.57 c.f.s. of water from Sand
Hollow, Application No. a-3970. This application
of Mill Creek Water Company to change the point
of diversion of the Sand Hollow waters described
but two points of diversion. It does not set forth
14

the extent of each area, or the points of development
work therein or the points of comingling waters
within such area. (R. 96 ; Ex. 6)
24. On August 7, 1961, the City of St. George
filed in the name of the new Mill Creek Water Company, in the District Court in and for Washington
County, State of Utah, Civil Action No. 2940, naming Israel Neilsen, et al. as defendants, whereby
said company sought an order permitting it to enter
upon the lands of the defendants for the purpose of
collecting water and for the construction of reservoirs and ditches for the conveying of the subject
waters "for the benefit of its stockholders." ( R. 96;
R. 1-5)
25. On September 20, 1961, in civil action No.
2940, an order was entered by said court, granting
the possession of easements and rights of way to
construct a ditch across lands of the defendants
named in said action. ( R. 96; R. II 6-8)
26. On October 2, 1961, Melvin Adams, Steven
Kirkland and Marion Jolley filed Application No.
a-4017 with the State Engineer, seeking a permanent change of point of diversion of 2.57 c.f.s. of
water from Sand Hollow. (R. 96-97; Ex. 7)
27. On April 6, 1962, the State Engineer rejected Applications numbered 29676 and a-4017,
filed by Washington City and by Melvin Adams,
Steven Kirkland and Marion Jolley respectively, on
the grounds that there was no unappropriated
water in the stream and for the further reason that
15

none of the individual parties were proper applicants, since they did not hold water rights privately, they being minority stockholders in the
new Mill Creek Water Company. (R. 97; Exs. 2, 7)
28. Also on April 6, 1.962, the State Engineer
approved Applications numbered a-3592 and a-3593,
filed by Washington City and a-3970 filed by St.
George City in the name of the Mill Creek Water
Company to permanently change the points of diversion of the waters of the Mill Creek. However, from
1957 to date, Washington City has been deprived
by 'St. George City of the .38 c.f.s. of water to which
Washington City is entitled under the Virgin River
Decree, and has been prevented from changing the
point of diversion, which it is entitled to change under Applications numbered a-3592 and a-3593 as
approved by the Utah State Engineer. (R. 97; Exs.
4, 5)
29. On June 5, 1962, Washington City, Melvin Adams, Marion Jolley and Steven Kirkland filed
Civil Action No. 3036 in the District Court in and
for Washington County, Utah, which action was for
review of the State Engineer's action in the Matters
of Change Applications numbered a-3970, a-3592,
a-3593, a-4017 and 29676. (R. 97; R.III 1-3)
30. On November 28, 1.962, Cases numbered
2508, 2940 and 3036 were consolidated for trial.
(R. 97; R. 30)
31. On the 21st day of January, 1963, motions
for summary judgment came on regularly for hear16

ing before the Fifth Judicial District Court in and
for Washington County, the Honorable C. Nelson
Day presiding (Tr. 1-61). Following arguments of
counsel for all parties and the submission of briefs,
the motions were taken under advisement by the
court.
32. On the 4th day of August, 1964, the court
entered its memorandum decision on the motions for
summary judgment (R. 86-89)
33. On the 20th day of May, 1965, in support
of the said memorandum decision Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and a Summary Judgment were
entered by the court (R. 90-103).
The trial court concluded:
(a) That the failure of the officers and
directors of the old Mill Creek Water Company to
amend its Articles for the purpose of continuing its
term of corporate existence was an inadvertance,
and oversight, and that such failure was not an intentional act or ommission for the purpose of in
fact terminating the corporate existence of the Mill
Creek Water Company;
(b) That when it was determined by these
Washington County farmers and water-users that
the time set forth in the original Articles had in fact
expired, they then acted to continue their ownership
and use of the same water by forming a new corporate entity with the same officers, directors and
stockholders except that there have been some
34.
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change in ownership by sale or trade of stock interests during the intervening period;
( c) That St. George City has acquired by
purchase 106 shares of the stock of the new Mill
Creek Water Company and by virtue of such purchase, St. George City has been entitled to 106/195
of the waters of Sand Hollow Creek since said shares
were purchased;
( d) That there was no termination of
ownership in or the use of the waters of Sand Hollow between February 1953 and February 1957,
and that the new company merely provided another
vehicle for such ownership and use of the subject
water;
( e) That insofar as is material and pertinent to each of the above entitled causes, the ne1c
Mill Creek Water Company succeeded to and has
all of the ownership, rights, interests and powers of
the old Mill Creek Water Company in and to the
waters of Sand Hollow or Mill Creek and in and to
the 2.57 c.f.s. of water decreed under and in the
Virgin River Decree;
(f) That since the new Mill Creek Water
Company succeeded to all the ownership, rights, and
interest and powers of the old Mill Creek Water
Company, the trial court acquired jurisdiction of the
proper parties in the proceedings under which St.
George was granted a temporary order of possession
of the waters awarded to the old Mill Creek Water
1
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Compalty under the Virgin River Decree, and said
new Mill Creek Water Company had the right to
sue and it could be sued;
(g) That the new Mill Creek Water Company had a right to apply for the change of point
of diversion of the waters applied for in Application No. a-3970, and that said new company did
comply with the laws pertaining to such applications and the State Engineer properly granted said
application and that the same should not be rejected;
and
(h) That St. George City in its application
for temporary change of point of diversion did not
conform to the provisions of Section 73-3-3 Utah
Code Annotated (1953). (R. 97, 98)
35. The reservoirs and ditches, for which the
easements and rights of way were sought in Civil
No. 2940, have in fact been constructed, all in the
absence of any application to the State Engineer
as required by Section 73-3-20 Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) as amended.
36. Since the "temporary" order of occupancy was entered by the trial court on the 20th day
of May, 1957, St. George City has continued during
the critical summer months in each of the interim
years to deprive the appellants of the water to which
they are legally entitled, resulting in a total loss
of their agricultural crops during the growing season from 1957 to and including the summer of 1965.
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37. St. George City has paid nothing to the
appellants for the water so taken or for the resultant damages.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1

AFTER THE PERIOD OF EXISTENCE OF A
CORPORATION HAS EXPIRED BY FORCE OF EXPRESS PROVISION IN ITS CHARTER, AND IN THE
ABSENCE OF ANY STATUTORY PROVISION AUTHORIZING ITS EXTENSION OR CONTINUANCE, IT BECOMES IPSO FACTO DISSOLVED AND NO LONGER
HAS ANY LEGAL EXISTENCE EITHER DE JURE
OR DE FACTO FOR THERE IS NO LAW UNDER
WHICH IT CAN EXIST.

The doctrine of the common law concerning
lapsation of corporate charters was that upon expiration o'f its charter a corporation at once lost its
identity and its powers; and it life was instantly
terminated. See discussion in In re Booth's Drug
Store Inc. 19 F. Supp. 95, at 96 (D.C. W. Va. 1937)
citing TAYLOR ON CORPORATIONS Sec. 21 (5th
Ed.); 1 Blackstone's Commentaries; ANG. And
AMES ON CORPORATIONS Sec. 770.
In the course of time, however, all of the states
have enacted statutes relating to the duties, powers,
responsibilities and liabilities of corporations as affected by their dissolution or the forfeiture of their
corporate existence. (See authorities cited under
Point 2 infra).
The modern general rule is that the expiration
of a corporate charter results in the instant legal
20

death of a corporation. In 47 A.L.R. 1282, at 129712.98 the rule is stated as follows:
" ... apart from the operation of a modifying statute, a corporation becomes absolutely dissolved and defunct, without any judicial pronouncement to that effect, when the
period of its existence as defined by the statute under which it was organized, or by its
charter or articles of association, has expired.
"If the charter be not extended, the very
moment that period arrives, the corporation
stands, not dormant, disabled, or incapable of
action merely, but absolutley dissolved, civilly
dead, without life or being, and altogether at
an end.
''If the law under which a corporation is
organized, or the special act creating the corporation, fixes a definite time when its corporate Hfe must end, it is evident that when
that date is reached said corporation is ipso
facto dissolved, without any direct action on
the part of the state or its members."

See also discussions in 97 A.L.R. 477, at 495 et seq;
8 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, 'Sec. 4096; 16A
Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Sec. 7981; 19 Am.
Jur. 2d Corporations, Secs. 1586, 1590, and 1648;
19 C.J.S. Corporations, Sec. 1653; and LATTIN ON
CORPORATIONS Page 555. See also M. H. McCarthy Co. v. Dubuque, Dist. Ct. 208 N.W. 505
(Iowa 1926); In re Koretke Brass and Mfg. Co.
Ltd., 196 So. 917 (La. 1940) ; Lake Superior Piling
Co. v. Stevens, 60 So.'2d 22'1 (La. 1'95'2); and Glenn
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v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 127 F.2d 820
(C.A. 6th 1942) .
Apparently this general problem has been before this Court on only one earlier occasion. in the
case of Houston v. Utah Lake, Land, Water and
Power Co., 55 Utah 393, 187 Pac. 174 (1919) this
Court, speaking through Justice Weber at 176,
stated:
"Numerous errors based upon exclusion
of testimony are assigned, but the only question that need be considered, and which is decisive, is whether a corporation whose charter
has been forfeited for the nonpayment of the
state corporation license tax in this state may
thereafter engage in new business and embark upon new enterprises,"
(Then follows the citation of Laws of 1917
which are similar to our present laws permitting its continued existence to wind up its
affairs).
"It is argued by counsel for appellants
that Section 870 not only 'extends the life of
the corporation for the purpose of winding up
its affairs,' but that it is 'a modification of or
the creation of a new purpose clause,' and that
therefore 'the question whether the transactions in question are beyond the powers of the
corporation must be determined with reference to whether they occurred for the purpose
of winding up the company.' Mr. Whitney, the
president of the Utah company, repeatedly
made the statement in his deposition that 'the
purchase of the stock of the Los Angeles Mortgage Company was done for the purpose of
winding up the affairs of the defendant corp22

oration.' Mr. Whitney's statement as to the
purpose of the various transactions to which
he testified is a bare conclusion. The undisputed facts are that a corporation that was
dead for all purposes except for winding up
its affairs purchased stock in a California
corporation, took charge of that corporation,
and engaged in a business that was beyond
the scope of its powers even before its civil
death. Instead of winding up the affairs of
the com'[Xlny, the testimony of Mr. Whitney
indicated an attempt to resuscitate it." (emphasis added)
"Whatever may have been Mr. Whitney's
purpose, his acts were designed and calculated not to wind up the affairs of the company, but to enlarge and extend its field of
operation. To contend that these transactions
had any tendency to close or wind up the business affairs of the Utah corporation is a mere
juggle with words. It is utterly fallacious to
say that a corporation by its corporate death
is given everlasting corporate Zif e ... " (emphasis added) . . .
It is, therefore, obvious that whether a corporate charter is lost through forfeiture for noncompliance with state law or through lapsation, the
period of its legal existence has terminated; and
the only course of action open to the corporation
through its board of directors is to wind up its affairs.
Moreover, where a corporation continues to exercise, without authority, its corporate powers after
the expiration of its charter by lapse of time, it does
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not become even a de facto corporation insofar as
it may assert rights and powers as a corporation.
See Screwmen's Benevolent Ass'rz. v. Monteleone,
123 So. 117 at 119 (La. 1929) ; and 8 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Sec. 3842.
POINT 2
THE ONLY LEGAL COURSE OF ACTION OPEN
TO THE OLD MILL CREEK WATER COMP ANY
AFTER THE LAPSATION OF ITS CORPORATE CHARTER IN 1953 WAS TO PROCEED TO WIND UP ITS
AFFAIRS AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 16-1-2 UT AH
CODE ANNOTATED (1953).

The statute which was controlling at the time
the charter of the old Mill Creek Water Company
lapsed on February 20, 1953, was Section 16-1-2
Utah Code Annotated (1953) which read as follows:
"Any corporation organized under the
laws of the territory or state of Utah whose
franchise has heretofore expired or may hereafter expire by limitation or by forfeiture, or
by dissolution by decree of court may nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding
up its affairs; and to effect this purpose may
sell or otherwise dispose of real and personal
property, sue and be sued, contract, and exercise all other incidental and necesary powers."
(emphasis added)
This statutory provision was repealed by laws
of 1961, Chapter 28, 'Section 142, but was nevertheless the controlling law throughout the period
here in question.
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This court in the Houston case, supra, drew
clea1· lines on what it meant to "wind up affairs."
The new Mill Creek vVater Company in incorporating under Utah law and seeking to appropriate to
itself the assets of the oUl corporation of the same
name acted neither in compliance with state statutes
or the pronouncements of this Court.
The authority to continue corporate existence
for the purpose of winding up its affairs may be
exercised by a corporation to the full extent necessary. However, it cannot simply continue its regular business. See generally 19 C.J.S. Corporations,
Sec. 17 43 (a) ( 4), Page 1509; Trower v. Stonebraka-Zea Livestock Co., 17 F.Supp. 687, at 689 (D.C.
Okla. 1937); In re International Sugar Feed Co.,
23 F.Supp. 197 (D.C. Minn. 1938); Jacques v.
Goggin et al., 245 S.W.2d 904, at 9'10 (Mo. 1952);
Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 213 S.W.2d 864,
at 871; Southwestern Construction Co. v. Robbins,
27 So.2d 705; and W estpark Realty Co. v. Porth,
212 N.W. 651; and 97 A.L.R. 477, at 495.

Even if present Utah law were applied to such
a situation, i.e. the lapsation of a corporate charter
due to the expiration of a term of existence provided
under its articles of incorporation, the maximum
pe1·iod which could be allowed to such a corporation
to correct the situation would 'be two years as pro25

vided by Section 16-10-100 Uwh Code Amwtated
(1953) as amended, which reads in part as follows:
"The dissolution of a corporation either:
... or (3) by expiration of its period of duration, shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or against the corporation,
its directors, officers, or shareholders, for any
right or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or
other proceeding thereon is commenced within
two years after the date of such dissolution.
Any such action or proceeding by or against
the corporation may be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate name.
The shareholders, directors and officers shall
have power to take such corporate or other
action as shall be appropriate to protect such
remedy, right or claim. If such corporation
was dissolved by the expiration of its period
of duration, such corporation may amend its
articles of incorporation at any time during
such period of two years so as to extend its
period of duration." (emphasis added)
The provisions of Section 16-1-2, Utah Code
Annotated {1953) still appear essentially in the
same form in the present code in Section 16-10-101
Utah Code Annotated {1953) as amended, which
now reads as follows :
"Notwithstanding the dissolution of a
corporation either ( 1) by the issuance of a
certificate of dissolut10n by the secretary of
state, or ( 2) by a decree of court, or ( 3) by
expiration of its period of duration, the corporate existence of such corporation shall nev26

ertheless continue for the purpose of winding up its affairs in respect to any property
and assets which have not been distributed
or otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such property and assets, sue and be sued, contract,
and exercise all other incidental and necessary powers." (emphasis added)
Admittedly, under the facts of the instant cases,
no effort was made by the old Mill Creek Water
Company to correct the lapsation of its charter
even if provision had existed for such action in 1953,
and such lapsation went unnoticed until the City of
St. George attempted to purchase the subject water
rights, St. George then concluded that the corporation was legally dead. The attempt to place the new
corporation on a firm legal basis as owner of the
assets of the old corporation and then attempt to
condemn its property must fail by reason of the
deficiency of the procedure followed.

It is obvious that the m o t i v e s for the
action of the directors in this attempt, whether for
the good faith purpose of creating a corporation
on a sound legal basis, or merely to facilitate the
contemplated condemnation of the subject waters
by St. George City, are irrelevant. Upon the expiration of its charter, the old Mill Creek Water died
a legal death and the only course of action open to
the directors was to proceed to wind up its affairs.
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POINT 3
UPON DISSOLUTION OF A CORPORATION, THE
CORPORA'TE PROPERTY VESTS IN THE STOCKHOLDERS, SUBJECT TO THE LIABILITIES OF THE
CORPORATION.

After dissolution the property and the assets
of a corporation are preserved for the benefit of
those entitled to share in them either as creditors
or stockholders, the property being that of the stockholders impressed with a trust in favor of creditors.
See generally 19 C.J.S. Corporations, Section 1730;
19A Am. Jur. Corporations, Sec. 1660; 16A Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations, Sections 8130, 8131
and 8134; and 97 A.L.R. 477 at 487. See also Smith
v. Long, 281 P.2d 483 at 486 (Idaho 1955) (citing
extensive authorities); Mt. Carmel R. Co. v. M. A.
Hanna Co., 89 A.2d 508 (Pa. 1952); Peora Coal Co.
v. Ashcraft, 17 S.E.2d 444 at 447 (W. Va. 1941);
Milgram v. Jiffy Equipment Co., '247 S.W.2d 668
at 676 (Mo. 1952); and Schram v. Houtteman, 50
F.Supp. 119 at 121 (D.C. Mich. 194'3).
This same principle applies to a mutual water
company. The general rule is stated in 3 Kinney 011
Irrigation and Water Rights, Sec. 1481, p. 2661-62
as follows:
"In the formation of mutual water or
irrigation corporations it is the usual .n:ode
of procedure for the owners of the ongmal
rights to deed to the corporation their water
rights and rights in the works, and then t11
take shares of stock for the same in the exact
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proportion as the value of the individual
rights granted bears to the whole value of the
property granted by all. It therefore follows
that, where this is done, the legal title to these
rights is in the corporation, while the equitable title remains in the original owners, or
their grantees. In other words, the company
holds the legal title to the property in trust
for its respective shareholders, the terms of
the trust to be governed by the articles of incorporation, or by-laws of the same.

"A mutual irrigation corporation may
dissolve, in which case the water rights revert to the shareholders in proportion to their
holdings in the corporation ... " (emphasis
added)
The nature of the rights of the shareholders
of a mutual water cornpany in Utah, were clearly
defined by this court in the case of Genola Town
v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P.2d 930, at 936
(1938) as follows:
" ... Stock in a mutual company entails
the right to demand such stockholder's aliquot
share of the water in proportion as his stock
holding bears to all the stock. Water rights are
pooled in a mutual company for convenience
of operation and more efficient distribution,
and perhaps for more convenient transfer.
But the stock certificate is not like the stock
certificate in a company operated for profit.
It is really a certificate showing an undivided part ownership in a certain water supply ... "
This principle was recently reaffirmed by this
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court in the case of Green Ditch Water Co. v. Salt
Lake City, 15 U.2d 224, 390 P.2d 586 (1964).
POINT 4
WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT THE WATERS OF A
MUTUAL IRRIGA:TION COMPANY CANNOT BE LOST
AS LONG AS ANY SHAREHOLDER MAKES USE OF
THE WATER, THIS PROTECTION CONTINUES ONLY
SO LONG AS THE CORPORATION CONTINUES TO
EXIST AS A LEGAL ENTITY.

The protection given to shareholders of a mutual irrigation company who are making no use of
their water rights, by shareholders who do use the
subject water rights, was discussed by this Court
in the case of Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co.
v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 105 Utah 468,
142 P.2d 866 at 869 (1943), where it stated through
Mr. Justice Larson that:
"The waters of a mutual irrigation company belong to the users, the company being
merely a distributing and apportioning trustee . . . The water controlled by it may be
used by any shareholders, subject only to the
regulation thereof by the company for the
benefit of the shareholders so none shall be
deprived of his rights by the others. The company cannot sell any of the water without the
consent of the stockholders or for nonpayment
of dues if the articles of incorporation make
the stock liable for such costs and expenses.
Likewise the company cannot permit the
water to be lost by non-use thereof as long as
any shareholder desires to and is in a position
to use the water. Water undistributed may be
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used by any stockholder in a position to use
it. The shareholders are in effect owners in
common of the waters with certain limitations as between one another governing the
use thereof. Each may therefore use any
water not being used by any other shareholder, as is the case with other owners in
common."
While it appears from the Smithfield decision
that the use of the company's water made by any
stockholder of a mutual irrigation company protects
those water rights being used, against appropriation by those who are not shareholders, it must
necessarily follow that this protection extends only
to the waters actually being used and such protection continues only so long as the covporation continues to exist, and that upon dissolution even the
protection provided by the corporation ends and the
waters which were controlled and used by the corporation then pass to the stockholders of record. From
that point in time any stockholder who ceased to
use the same, would lose his share of such water
rights, and the waters would become open to appropriation by others through compliance with the applicable Utah statutes covering appropriation, as
had the waters of the company at an earlier point
in time since the same were not being used by shareholders of the company.
After dissolution as discussed in Point 1 supra,
the remaining water rights ·of the old Mill Creek
Water Company passed to its shareholders of record
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as set out under No. 7 of the Statement of Facts
supra, in proportion to their interest in the old company. From that point in time forward, it would
appear logical that the water rights of each individual would be a matter of personal concern; and to
prevent the further loss of these rights through nonuse would be a matter for each individual holder of
such rights. Under Utah law the right of the users
of these waters would date from the priorities acknowledged by the Utah courts in the Virgin River
Decree, to-wit 1860 (Ex. 1). However, the long existent priorities would not prevent the loss of the
rights if the waters were subsequently abandoned
or forfeited under applicable statutes. (For this
Court's most recent discussion of the question of
abandonment and statutory forfeiture see In 1·e
Drainage Area of Boar River in Rich County, 12
U.2d 1, 361P.2d407 (1961); In re Escalante Valley
Drainage Area, 12 U.2d 112, 363 P.2d 777 (1961).
See also 2 Digest of Utah Water Law, pages 5 and
6.)
Since no evidence has been taken in the instant
cases concerning the use of the subject waters by
the former shareholders of the old company between
the years 192'3 and 195'7, the cases should be re·
mantled for a determination of these rights in terms
of the Mill Creek Water Company which retained
at least a part of its rights through the diligent use
of some of its shareholders, the individuals who re·
tained their rights through diligent use and acquired new rights through appropriation, those indi·
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viduals who lost their rights through abandonment
or forfeiture and a determination of the extent of
the rights of all individuals who are determined to
have retained valid rights in the waters of the Mill
Creek and Green Ditch in Washington County,
Utah.
POINT 5

THE NEW MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY
DOES NOT OWN ANY RIGHTS IN THE WATERS OF
THE SAND HOLLOW OR GREEN DITCH IN WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

The new Mill Creek Water Company which was
organized on February 8, 1957 did not then own and
does not now own rights in the waters of Sand
Hollow or the Green Ditch since no assignments or
other valid tr an sfer of such water rights from the
recognized legal owners have ever been made to the
new company.
POINT 6
THE NEW MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY WAS
NOT INCORPORATED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE
STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH AS THEY EXISTED ON FEBRUARY 8, 1957.

Section 16-2-5 ( 9) , Utah Code A nnovated
(1953) required that articles of incorporation state:
"How many of the entire board of directors
shall be necessary to form a quorum and be
authorized to transact the business and exercise the corporate powers of the corporation;
provided, that a quorum shall be not less than
one-fourth of the entire number."
Section 16-2-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
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requires inter alia the oath or affirmation of three
or more incorporators that:
" ... They have commenced, or it is bona
fide their intention to commence and carry
on, the business mentioned in the articles of
incorporation, and that . . . [they] ... believe
that each party to the articles of incorporation
has paid, or is able to and will pay the amount
of the capital stock subscribed for by him; and
that at least ten percent of the capital stock
subscribed by each stockholder and not less
than ten percent of the capital stock of the
corporation has been paid in ... "
The incorporators of the new Mill Creek Water
Company did not comply with the foregoing statutory provisions (See Ex. 9) .
The result is that the Corporation did not become a corporation de jure. It had no standing at
law and could not lawfully be the defendant, under
such circumstances, to the eminent domain suit
brought by the City of St. George. It possessed
neither a qualified legal existence nor possessed any
of the property rights involved in said action.
POINT 7
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2508 BROUGHT BY THE CITY
OF ST. GEORGE TO CONDEMN THE WATERS OF
THE NEW MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY WAS AN
INEFFECTUAL ACTION IN THAT THE NEW MILL
CREEK WATER COMPANY HAD NO RIGHTS IN THE
SUBJECT WATERS WHICH COULD BE CONDEMNED
BY ST. GEORGE CI'TY, AND ALL OWNERS OF SUCH
RIGHTS WERE NOT JOINED IN THE ACTION.

Since on the facts of this case it appears that
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the city of St. George was attempting to dbtain additional culinary water through condemnation of the
Sand Hollow or Mill Creek waters in Washington
County, it was mandatory that all individuals owning such water rights be properly made parties defendant to any condemnation action. The city of St.
George, however, chose to sue the new Mill Creek
Water Company, and merely joined thereto as parties defendant the individual appellants in these
cases. The individuals owning the full 2.57 c.f.s of
water, including those individuals who had acquired
portions thereof through appropriation after abandonment by the original owners thereof, should all
have been before the court in said action No. 2508,
and their absence would make an equitable final
determination of the action impossible. Clearly the
summary judgment entered by the court below without having before it the facts upon which to determine the issues raised by appellants' contention that
they had appropriated certain of the waters abandoned by the oUl, company, and holding that the
new company was the owner of all of the rights of
the old company is without any foundation and results in the appellants having been deprived of their
property without due process of law. Appellants
at the least were entitled to put before the court the
facts and have their rights adjudicated based thereon. As this case now stands they have not had their
case heard and other persons, claimants to some of
the water in question, were not even joined in the
1

1

action. This peremptory action of the lower court
cannot be sustained on the law for reasons heretofore argued. We submit a trial under proper instructions from this Court is required to protect
the appellants' constitutional rights.
POINT 8
THE UTAH STATE ENGINEER ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT EITHER WASHING TON CITY'S APPLICATION NO. 29676 OR THE APPLICATION OF THE
OTHER APPELLANTS HEREIN, NO. a-4017, SINCE
THESE PARTIES WERE THE SOLE USERS OF THE
WATERS OF THE MILL CREEK WHICH HAD BEEN
ABANDONED PRIOR TO 1953, AND WERE ALSO VIR·
TUALLY THE SOLE USERS OF THE REMAINDER
OF THE SUBJECT WATERS AFTER 1953.

With such scant evidence before the trial court it
was obviously impossible for the court to determine
precisely who had utilized the subject waters during
the years 1923 through 1957. However, a determin·
ation of these facts is essential to an equitable disposition of the subject cases. The cases should, therefore, be remanded to the trial court for a determin·
ation on the facts as to who precisely was using the
subject waters during the critical periods here in
question. Based on this determination the proper
parties might recover for any damages arising out
of the improper granting of the order of occupancy
entered the 20th day of May, 1957.
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POINT 9
SINCE THE ORDER OF OCCUPANCY WAS ERHONEOUSLY ISSUED IN CIVIL NO. 2508, APPLICATION NO. 59-5 WAS ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED TO
ST. GEORGE CITY BY THE UTAH STATE ENGINEER.

Since the city of St. George was already in
possession of the subject 2.57 c.f.s. of water and had
been making use thereof since the 20th day of May,
1957, it is understandable that the Utah State Engineer granted Application No. 59-5. (Ex. 3) However, the 2.57 c.f.s. of water were still legally the
property of the individuals who had been making
use of the same either as stockholders in the old
Mill Creek Water Company, or as appropriators.
The city of St. George had allegedly by 1957
purchased a portion of the stock in the new Mill
Creek Water Company, but since that Company did
not at any time own any of the water in question
the pm·chase of this stock availed it nothing. Clearly
it did not thereby become entitled to the entire 2.57
e.f.s. which it procured by the order of occupancy.
The determination of the Utah State Engineer in
granting Application No. 59-5 should, therefore, be
reversed by this Court.
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POINT 10
THE UTAH STATE ENGINEER PROPERLY
GRANTED THE CITY OF WASHING TON APPLICATIONS NUMBERED a-3592 AND a-3593, WHICH
GRANTED A PERMANENT CHANGE OF POINT OF
DIVERSION OF .38 c.f.s. OF WATER, SINCE THE
CITY OF WASHINGTON WAS ENTITLED TO THIS
WATER UNDER THE VIRGIN RIVER DECREE.

Following the acquisition of the subject waters
by the city of 'St. George in 1957 and the installation of its collection facilities whereby the entire
flow of the Mill Creek was diverted to the St. George
water system, it became evident to the city of Washington that in order to utilize the water decreed
to it under the Virgin River Decree, it must collect
the same upstream from the diversion works constructed by the city of St. George. Washington City,
being entitled to the subject .38 c.f.s. of water, was
also entitled, pursuant to proper application to the
Utah State Engineer's office, to have the point of
diversion of the subject water changed in such a
way that the water right could be utilized. Since
the order of occupancy of May 20, 1957, however,
the city of St. George has continued to utilize the
entire flow of the Mill Creek and has blatantly ignored the rights, not only of Washington City to the
subject waters, but also ignored the rights of the
other appellants herein. (See Exs. 4, 5) The trial
court should upon remand be directed to enter a
decree enforcing the rights of Washington City
and restraining St. George from interference therwith.
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POINT 11
APPLICATION NO. a-3970 FILED BY THE NEW
MILL CREEK WATER COMP ANY WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED BY THE UTAH STATE ENGINEER
SINCE SAID COMPANY HAD NO STANDING TO
SEEK THE SAME.

The real party in interest in seeking the change
of point of diversion in Application No. a-3970 was
St. George City, not the Mill Creek Water Company.
However, since the city of St. George had already
been denied the right to make the contemplated
changes in the point of diversion and utilization
of the waters ( Exs. 7, 8), no other alternative existed other than to seek the desired changes in the name
of the "Mill Creek Water Company." As discussed
supra, however, the new Mill Creek Water Company
possessed no rights in the subject waters and, therefore, possessed no standing to seek the requested
change. In addition, it is important to note that in
making Application No. a-3970, little attempt was
made by St. George City, in the name of the "Mill
Creek Water Company," to comply with the requirements of Section 73-3-3 Utah Code Annotated
( 1953) as amended in that the application does not
clearly set forth the extent of the points of diversion, development work, and of co-mingling.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the decision of the
lower court whereby summary judgment was grant39

ed in favor of the respondents and against the appellants, and should further rule as a matter of law
that:
(a) The Corporation known and referred to
as the old Mill Creek Water Company ceased to exist
as a legal entity when its charter expired February
20, 1953; and its assets, including the water rights
then owned by it, reverted to the stockholders of
record of said company on that date;
(b) The new Mill Creek Water Company incorporated in Utah February 8, 1957, did not by
virtue of its incorporation succeed to the rights and
to the property owned by the old corporation of the
same name;
( c) The action of the lower court whereby an
order of occupancy which deprived the appellants of
their water rights based on the false premise that
the new Mill Creek Water Company was the owner
and had succeeded to the rights of the old company,
is erroneous. In recognizing the new company as the
proper party against which to proceed in condemning the rights which were the property of the old
company, the decision results in a deprivation of
the appellants of their property without due pro·
cess of law.
( d) The City of Washington is the owner of
.38 c.f.s. of the water of the Mill Creek as shown by
the record and is entitled to the use thereof.
40

The cases should be remanded to the district
court for trial under the law of this case as established by the ruling of this Court on the foregoing
matters. The district court should be instructed to
determine what water rights exist in Mill Creek
or Sand Hollow, who the owners of such rights are,
the use that has been made of the subject water
rights during the years 19'23 to 1957, the status,
as appropriateors before the State Engineer, of the
parties to these actions; and this Court should direct that all rulings of the State Engineer heretofore made involving water rights now before this
Court in the instant litigation should be suspended
pending the final determination of this lawsuit. The
trial court should be further instructed to determine
the amount of damages, if any, suffered by appellants, as a result of having been deprived of the use
of waters of Mill Creek or Sand Hollow, by virtue
of the order of occupancy erroneously granted by the
trial court on May 20, 1957.
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